

ARMY UNDER THE EARLY TURKISH SULTANS

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This is to certify that Mr. Ali Athar has done his research work under my supervision. This dissertation prepared by him on "Army under the Early Turkish Sultans" is his original work and is fit for submission for the award of M.Phil degree.

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(Prof.) K.A. Nizami
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DEDICATED TO MY
LOVING PARENTS

C O N T E N T S

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TURKISH AND RAJPUT TRADITIONS OF WARFARE

INTRODUCTION

The military success achieved by the Turks against the Rajput rulers of Northern India towards the close of the twelfth century calls for a scientific analysis of the modes of warfare and war technology employed in India and Central Asia.

The Rajputs were indifferent towards having a frontier defended by forts or other military techniques. This was an advantage for the north-west invaders, who did not have to face stiff resistance at all boarders. Though a tax known as turushki danda was realized for meeting the increased cost of resisting the Turkish invasions, no well planned policy of garrisoning the frontiers was followed.

According to Alberuni caste considerations stood in the way of contact with the foreigners. Thus the territories occupied by the Ghaznavids i.e. beyond the Sutlej "was no more their (Rajputs) concern for the obvious reason that having been defiled by the presence of the Musalmans, even its Hindu population could not be reclaimed to the Hindu fold."[1] This reflects lack of political fore-

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1. P. Saran, 'Resistance of Indian Princes to Turkish Offensive (end of 10th century A.D. to

(Footnote continued)

...2

sight on the part of the Indian rulers. They did not utilize the opportunity of capturing back the territories from the Musalmans who were in constant conflict for power in Central Asia. The Ghaznavids were tamed by the Seljuqs and later by the Ghorids and the Khwarazmshahis. The Indian Rajputs could have built up a strong line of defence to save themselves from further invasions, but "such a thing as a regular defence organisation as was called for by the threat of Turkish invasions, was foreign to their imagination. They ignominiously failed to take advantage of the splendid opportunity which the precarious political predicament of the Ghaznavids offered them."[1] An example can be cited from the events of 1191 A.D., when in the first battle of Tarain, Prithviraj routed the Turks led by Muhammad Ghuri, the former did not follow up his victory in completely wiping off the Turks from the Indian land, but he wasted his efforts in reducing the fort of Bhatinda which was under the command of Qazi Ziaud-Din

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(Previous Footnote continued)

first quarter of 14th), Sita Ram Kohli Memorial Lectures, 1966-67, p. 17. Hereafter cited as Resistance of Indian Princes to Turkish Offensive. D. Sharma, Early Chauhan Dynasties, Delhi, 1959, pp. 61-62.

1. 'Resistance of Indian Princes to Turkish Offensive', p. 29.

Tulak.[1] He was, however, ineffective in capturing the fort for thirteen months and in the meantime the second invasion of Muhammad Ghuri sealed the fate of any Rajput resistance as the second battle of Tarain brought about a complete overthrow of the Rajput confederacy. Prithviraj made a grave strategical mistake of warfare. He "failed to realise that reducing an internal fortress was a matter of comparatively minor importance".[2] Had he utilized the interval in fortifying the frontiers, perhaps the Turkish invaders would have been confronted with a very difficult situation of resistance.[3]

The Rajputs were armed with lance, javelin, swords and daggers. They defended themselves with armour and shield. The army was composed of elephantry, cavalry and infantry. The Rajputs relied heavily on the elephant corps which in the hands of expert generals could prove

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1. Minhaj-i Siraj al Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, Bib. Indica, Calcutta, 1864, p. 118. Hereafter cited as Minhaj; Raverty, H.G., English Translation, Delhi, Reprint 1970, p. 458. Henceforth cited as Tabaqat-i Nasiri English Translation.

2. 'Resistance of Indian Princes to Turkish Offensive' p. 30.

3. Ibid., p. 30.

"dreadful and devastating on the enemies, but if they badly handled their destructive force could recoil on their own army."[1] Muhammad Ghuri once ordered Qutbuddin Aibak to train the horses to accustom themselves to the sight of elephants of which they were afraid, by constructing models of elephants and galloping the horses in front of it.[2] The Rajput code of war was personal hand to hand fight and the element of mobility in war tactics which had developed in Central Asia was unknown to them. They knew a "simple method of dashing against the foe and joining him in hand to hand combat. They were much too vain of their prowess and valour and understood warfare as no more than a game of wrestling on a magnified scale."[3] The institution of jauhar further added to the problem. In battles temporary defeats, retreats etc are common, but the Rajput practice of jauhar took only success or failure into account and ignored all realistic

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1. 'Resistance of Indian Princes to Turkish Offensive', p. 51.

2. Futuh-us Salatin, English Translation, Mehdi Husain, Bombay, 1967, p. 148. Hereafter cited as Futuh-us Salatin English Translation.

3. 'Resistance of Indian Princes to Turkish Offensive', p. 52.

planning including temporary rebuffs and reversals. If their attack failed it was difficult for them to regroup and fight again in a proper order. They did not act upon the 'ambush' tradition of war. Never do we find an Indian army laying an ambush for the invaders. This strategy should have been the best means to expell the invaders as the inhabitants of this country knew fully well the geography of the country and they could have utilised this strategy at the best known places. The Rajputs' intelligence system was also not up to the mark. They could not keep an eye on the enemy's movements, let alone its composition, strength and strategy. The only means of defence on which the Rajput strategy was planned was defence through the forts. They were experts in building impregnable forts, like the forts of Ranthambhor, Kalinjar, Gwalior, Koil, etc, but they were unable to consider the tactics employed by the besiegers. The fact that the strongest of forts ultimately had to yield to the pressure shows that these forts could not be linked up to any effective defence mechanism outside the forts, linking these forts as one defence umbrella covering the whole area.[1] Muhammad Ghuri captured the fort

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1. Nizami, K.A., Some Aspects of Religions and Politics in India During the Thirteenth Century, Aligarh 1961, p. 80. Hereafter cited as Nizami, K.A.

of Tabarhind in no time but the same fort took thirteen months for Prithviraj to capture.[1]

One of the basic defects of the Indian armies was their feudal character. The feudal levies could never be woven into a compact, well-knit military organization and their methods of discipline, methods of recruitment, payment, etc., remained different. The concept of army as one single unit --- centrally recruited, centrally paid and centrally administered --- was alien to the Rajput military system.

The military success achieved by the Turks against the Rajput rulers of North India towards the close of the twelfth century calls for a scientific analysis of modes of warfare and war technology employed in India and Central Asia.

The Turks were known as Ashwapatis i.e. lords of horses.[2] This name must have been given for some very significant reason. It was the "pace and agility of their horses" and "the tactics of the horse archers"

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1. Tabaqat-i Nasiri, English Translation, p. 464.

2. Nizami, K.A., p. 82.

who were "quicker and more flexible in manoeuvre"[1] that caused the greatest damage to the "huge and unwieldy phalanx of Indian armies headed by elephants with gorgeous trappings."[2]

The Rajputs have been blamed for their defeat for not having a centrally recruited army. "The Rajput armies mainly consisting of feudal levies --- raised by different Rajput leaders, trained under different conditions and employed on different terms lacked unity of purpose and fought for individual glory."[3]

We must on the other hand not forget that the army of Muhammad Ghuri too consisted men of different nationalities --- Turks, Tajiks and Afghans --- but they were centrally recruited, with one purpose and under one command. Regarding their ability to fight all these Turks, Tajiks and Afghans were good horsemen and archers.

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1. Smail, R.C., Crusading Warfare 1097-1193 AD, Cambridge, 1956, p. 77. Hereafter cited as Smail, R.C.

2. Nizami, K.A., p. 82.

3. Nizami, K.A., p. 81.

The Rajputs when accumulated together fought as individuals to which Professor Nizami comments that "the Indians looked upon military art as merely an affair of personal combat at a time when the conception of the whole army as a repository of organized force had already gained ground.[1] The Turks relied on swift movements of their troops combined with accurate shooting from the horseback. Even their provisions were carried by fast-trotting camels.[2] The horsemen had light offensive weapons like bow and arrows, lance and sword and there were different set of troops clad in heavy armour for themselves and their horses and possessed long spears, "Their massed charge was irresistible on the plains of North India."[3]

The Rajputs believed in crushing the enemy with their heavily armed elephants and infantry, "cavalry never came to occupy the front rank in the army organization of Ancient India, it never in fact came to

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1. Nizami, K.A., p. 81.

2. Sarkar, J.N., Military History of India, Calcutta 1960, p. 26. Hereafter cited as Sarkar, J.N.

3. Sarkar, J.N., p. 28.

form the core of a Hindu army."[1]

The best breeding grounds for war horses were in Central Asia. The absence of evidence about the supply of Tartari horses by the merchants does suggest that it was prevented by the ruler of Ghaznin. The possession of a good war horse by Indian prince was not possible. In India the Kuhpaya region too was a breeding ground for Hindi or Baladasti horse, but they were inferior to those breeds of Central Asia.[2] Later horses and elephants both were supplied by the Indian vassals. Kaiqubad once said that "All my swift horses I obtain from Tilang and all my vigorous elephants from Bengal."[3] On the battle-field the Turks employed superior and scientific tactics to outclass the Rajputs in spite being less in numerical strength. They never close upon the enemy and shot accurately with their bows to disorder the enemys' flanks. They kept enough distance that in case of retreat, the

1. P.C. Chakravarty, 'The Art of War in Ancient India', Calcutta 1943, p. 36.

2. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 51.

3. Amir Khusrau, Qiran-us Sa'adain, Eng. tr., in Elliot & Dowson, Vol. III, p. 526.

enemy could never catch them with their horses of inferior breed. They always kept a reserve force to act in emergent time or in assisting any flank which was weak, but usually they were used as "shock" forces which turned many battles in their favour.[1]

In the second battle of Tarain, Muhammad Ghuri had 12,000 steel clad armours, select men mounted on superb horses, kept under his personal command.[2] The army was divided into four divisions, the left wing, right wing, the vanguard and the centre. In the rear was the reserve force.[3] The position of the cavalry, infantry and elephant corps were constantly changed according to the strategy adopted by the Sultan.Usually the cavalry were alwayson the move harassing the enemy "large bodies of horse-archers hovered about and plied their bows against various points of line."[4] Muhammad

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1. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Adab ul Harb wash Shujaah, Persian text, edited by A.S. Khwansari, Teheran 1927, p. 334. Hereafter cited as Adab ul Harb; Sarkar, J.N., p. 36.

2. Minhaj, p. 120; Sarkar, J.N., p. 36; Habib, M., and Nizami, K.A., Comprehensive History of India, Vol. V, New Delhi, Reprint 1982, p. 162. Hereafter cited as Comprehensive History of India, Vol. V.

3. Adab ul Harb, p. 334.

4. Oman, C.W.C., A History of the Art of War in Middle Ages, New York, 1960, pp. 217-18. Hereafter cited as Oman, C.W.C.

Ghuri had ordered his reserve cavalry during the second battle of Tarain that "It is necessary that, on the right and left, and front and rear, 10,000 mounted archers should keep the infidel host in play, and when their elephants, horsemen, and foot advance to the attack, you are to face about and keep the distance of a horse's course in front of them."[1]

In the battle first the vanguard should lead the attack, then the right wing, followed by the centre and finally the left wing. The commanders of the different wings with their troops and standards should stand firm in their respective places and wait for the King's order and act accordingly.[2]

Such traditions were the outcome of the developments taking place in Central Asia. The high breed horses played the most important role in keeping the Indian Rajputs in play. The tactics of feigned retreat were the traditional manner in which they tricked the enemy to pursue them in disorderly manner, while

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1. Tabaqat-i Nasiri, English translation, p. 468.

2. Adab ul Harb, p. 334.

the Turks kept their places intact even in retreat. While 'retreating' they turned in their saddles and shot with great accuracy. Smail, R.C. while describing the Turks' tactics of war says, "If a charge was essayed against them, they were ready to retreat, if the attempt was given up, they themselves attacked once more. The Turks might be scattered, but always they returned to the fight, now they faced the enemy, now they turned away ..... they were like flies who could be beaten off but not driven away."[1] Their 'feigned retreat' lasted for many days to weary the enemy, and then suddenly they ambushed the enemy."They used their mobility to attack the flanks and rear of the enemy"[2] The most outstanding technique was "They used their bow from the saddle, and shot without halting or dismounting as a result they were able to combine their archery with ----- their mobility."[3] Such tactics baffled the Hindus and "they spent all their energy and time in the futile game of chasing and trying to catch up the elusive Central Asian horsemen before them --- at the end the Hindus were utterly dis-

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1. Smail, R.C., p. 78.
2. Ibid., p. 79.
3. Smail, R.C., pp. 80-81.

prited by the futile of their exertion and exhausted from hunger and thirst."[1]

The Turks divided their armies on the decimal system with the commanders being Maliks, Amirs, Sipah-Salars and Sarkhayls. The military designation of Khan came in vogue after the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate under Sultan Iltutmish. The Turks obeyed their immediate commanders who got their orders from the superiors. The Rajputs on the other hand grouped together under their feudal lords lacked the unification of command. They had never attempted to keep in contact with the Central Asian powers as they never ventured to cross the territorial barriers which were occupied by the mlechas. Hence "they forgot the profound importance of geography. They never took advantage of the immense natural advantages of the vastness of the country or of it's rivers, forests etc., either to obstruct or isolate the enemy and circumvent him .... these Hindu warriors never understood that the cost of geographical ignorance is immeasurable."[2]

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1. Sarkar, J.N., pp. 36-37.

2. 'Resistance of Indian Princes to Turkish Offensive', p. 56.

Their war horses and elephants were trained more for "royal pageants than for serious warfare"[1] and thus these two main offensive arms of the army proved ineffective in the battle-field. Monserrate rightly says that "The Musalmans say that the Rajputs know how to die but not how to fight."[2]

In this dissertation an attempt is made to study the army organization of the Turks during its early period.


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1. Ibid., p. 57.


2. Quoted in 'Resistance of Indian Princes to Turkish Offensive', p. 57.


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شکل لشکرگاه هندوان





شکل لشکرگاه کافران
ختا بر این جمله است و
نشاید که مسلمانان خود را
بکافران مانند کنند و دیگر
اگر خصمی خواهد که وقتی

بمعاقصه خود را بر قلب و
سرای پرده زند و جهانی
خراب کند تا از هر طرف
کسی برسد او کار خود بکرده
باشد و فارغ شده

CHAPTER - I

THE TURKISH ARMY - COMPOSITION & TRAINING

The Ghurid armies which invaded India seem to have been composed of diverse elements; Turks, Tajiks, Khaljis and Afghans. The Tarikh-i Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah refers to the composition of Turkish armies under Aibak:

با چندان لشکر که در ضمن رایات عالیه بودند از ترک وغوری وخراسانی وخلجی وحشم هندوستان ازرا لکان ونکران وباسعیدان وتغاریق هیچ آفریده را زهرهٔ آن نبود -

The Indian troops did accompany him when he moved to help the son of Rae Pithora against Hiraj.[1] During the reign of Sultan Iltutmish many of the above mentioned tribes did exist but the prominent Maliks belonged to Khitai, Qarakhita, Qipchaq, Garji and Ilbari Turks.[2]

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1. Elliot & Dowson, History of India as told by its own historians, Aligarh, Vol. II, pp.217-18. Hereafter cited as Elliot & Dowson; Raverty, H.G., footnotes on p. 517.

2. Nizami, K.A., p. 127.

Malik-Yughan-tat was a Khitai[1] and so was Malik Saifud-Din Bat Khan-i Bak.[2]

Among the Qarakhita Maliks, were Malik Tughril-i-Tughan Khan,[3] Malik Ikhtiyar-ud-Din Kara Kash Khan-i-Aetikin[4] and Malik Ikhtiyar-ud-Din Aetkin.[5] Malik Tamar Khan-i-Kiran,[6] Malik Taj-ud-Din Sanjar-i-Kikluk[7] and Malik Izz-ud-Din Balban[8] were of Qipchaq. Of the Ilbari Turks were Malik Sher Khan[9] and Ulugh Khan.[10]

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1. Minhaj, p. 238; Tabaqat-i Nasiri, English translation, p. 731.

2. Tabaqat-i Nasiri, Eng. tr., p. 757.

3. Ibid., p. 736.

4. For the Qarakhita see Minhaj, pp. 242, 249, 252, English Translation, p. 746.

5. Tabaqat-i Nasiri, English Translation,p.749.

6. Tabaqat-i Nasiri, English Translation, p.742.

7. Ibid., p. 754.

8. Ibid., p. 775; See Minhaj, pp. 247, 256, 258, 262.

9. Minhaj, p. 276; Tabaqat-i Nasiri, English Translation, p. 791.

10. Minhaj p. 281; Tabaqat-i Nasiri, English Translation, p. 800.

The Sultans of Delhi admitted to their armies all those who wanted to join the military service. In fact they threw open service in the army "to all properly trained soldiers, who could stand the strains of war. Thus Indian armies came into existance in which martial talent was drawn up from all sources irrespective of caste, creed or colour."[1]

Sultan Razia did not hesitate to recruit Hindu soldiers for regaining the throne. "She recruited from that area many men who were well-known for their skill in war, like Todar, Chitoi, Khokhar and Birah."[2]

This led to a change in the traditional composition of Indian armies. The soldiers in the army of Delhi Sultan were not recruited on any feudal basis and were not confined to any particular caste. The paiks (foot soldiers) were replaced by the sawaran-i muqatala (mounted fighting men) and thus brought India militarily on par with Central Asian powers.[3]

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1. Comprehensive History of India, Vol. V, p. 188.
2. Futuh-us Salatin, English Translation, p. 259.
3. Nizami, K.A., p. 87; Comprehensive History of India, Vol. V, p. 188.

TRAINING

The soldiers of those days were well-known for their skill in archery, riding and fencing. They in fact knew all the methods of self defence. This can be corroborated by the fact that at the time of recruitment the candidates displayed their skill and prowess in the presence of the Ariz and when the latter was satisfied, then only the candidate was put on pay roll.[1] The Ariz however reserved his right to pick and enrol the candidates whom he liked. Muhammad-i-Bakhtiyar Khalji was rejected by the Diwan-i-Arz in Ghaznin because "his outward appearance was humble and unprepossessing." In Delhi too he was rejected on the same ground.[2]

Apart from the basic training which was inherent in the soldiers, the army was trained in a scientific way. The soldiers duringthe peace time took part in different kinds of games and sports. Fakhr-i Mudabbir states that soldiers trained their muscles by exercising. They played chaugan (polo),

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1. Ziaud-Din Barani, Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, Bib. Indica, 1890, p. 102. Hereafter cited as Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi.

   Qureishi, I.H., The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi, Lahore 1944, p. 137. Hereafter cited as Qureishi, I.H.

2. Tabaqat-i Nasiri, English Translation,p.549.

did weight-lifting, wrestling, boxing, disc throwing (to train for jak throwing) fencing etc.[1] Such military training must have kept them fit throughout. Regarding the ability of horse-riding an account is given of Malik Taj-ud-Din Sanjar-i-Kurat Khan by Minhaj. He says, "he would have two horses under saddle, one of which he would ride, and the other, he would lead after him, and thus used to dash on, and whilst the horses were galloping, he would leap from this horse to that with agility, would return to this first one again, so that, during a gallop, he used several times to mount two horses."[2]

The Turks were quick to judge their own military weakness and they made sure of overcoming such weakness. After the first battle of Tarain, Muhammad Ghuri asked Qutub-ud-Din Aibak to train the horses as they were afraid of elephants. He said, "The horses of our army have never seen the features of elephants. Our cavalry men suffer defeat because our horses fight shy

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1. Adab ul Harb, MS., Asiatic Society, Calcutta, Add. 16, 853/487, pp. 197b-198. Hereafter cited as Adab ul Harb MS.

2. <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u>, English Translation, p. 756.

of the elephants. You should order that some elephants of mud and wood-mountain like and steady-be made and installed in the midst of the field, all wearing arms and clad in armour. Then all our troops should mount their horses, wearing war arms and arrive in the field galloping their distance travelling horses. When our horses become accustomed to the sight of the elephant, our cavalrymen will not be defeated."[1]

The Central Asian army were armed with different types of bow namely, chachi, khwarizmi, parwanchi, ghaznichi, lahori, etc.[2] Then there is a mention of mountains bow by Farkhr-i Mudabbir which were made of horn and were 'true in their aim'. Then the Indian bow (kaman-i hindavi) is mentioned which were made from bamboo, but its arrow did not travel far, though at a close distance it was very effective.[3] The Indian arrows were many headed, and while flying go snaking. Their points were poisonous. In the hilly areas of India, arrows were made from bones of dead

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1. Futuh-us Salatin, English Translation, p. 148.

2. Adab ul Harb, p. 242.

3. Ibid., p. 242.

animals and were poisonous and when one is hit, he is fatally wounded.[1] The arrows made from poplar or cane tree did not travel fast due to its heaviness but they inflicted a fatal wound from a close distance.[2] The arrows made of reed, travelled fast, straight and far, and if pointed with steel it made a coat of mail useless.[3] The reed arrows were used by the Rajputs as well since it was commonly found in India, but the bows of the Central Asian archers were of more superior quality and they used "various kinds of arrows -------- for effective use on different occasions."[4] Arrows which were intended to pass through a coat of mail or a breast plate, were fish-backed or round.[5]

The Turks were great archers. It was their technique of utilizing bow and arrows with great accuracy which helped them to win many battles. Hasan

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1. Adab ul Harb, pp. 242-43.
2. Ibid., p. 244.
3. Ibid., p. 244.
4. Ibid., p. 242.
5. Ibid., p. 242.

Nizami says that Muslim archers were such that they "could in the dark night hit with their arrows the mirror on the forehead of an elephant."[1] The accuracy with which they shot while riding on a horseback has been described by Smail, R.C. that "They used the bow from the saddle, and shot without halting or dismounting as a result they were able to combine their archery with ------- their mobility."[2]

In the army there was a master-archer who seldom missed the target he aimed at. He could with one shot kill the enemy's commander and decide the battle or shoot at the head of the commander's elephant and gain the initiative required to win the battle.[3] Such a scene was witnessed when Muhammad Ghuri proceeded against the Rai of Benaras, Jai Chand. The latter, who was seated on the howdah of his elephant, was shot by an arrow and he "fell from his escalted seat to the earth."[4] Thus ending the battle in

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1. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. II, p. 235.
2. Smail, R.C., pp. 80-81.
3. Adab ul Harb MS, pp. 110a,b, 109b.
4. Elliot and Dowson, Vol. II, p. 221.

favour of Muhammad Ghuri.

The frequent hunting expeditions of Sultan Balban was nothing else but a military exercise. Halaku is reported to have said "He (Balban) goes out apparently to hunt but really to exercise his men and horses, so that they may not be wanting when times of danger and war arrive."[1] W.F. Paterson in his article, "The Archers of Islam" mentions about _turusiyya_ exercises, namely _qiqaj_ and _qabaq_. In _qiqaj_ the target was basically a mound of earth, or something similar, on the ground at which the archer shot as he went by at full gallop. The other form of shooting was _qabaq_ where a gourd was hoisted to the top of a mast and served as a target at which the archer shot as he rode beneath it."[2]

The soldiers also knew how to make bow and arrows. This skill was taught to them so that they may utilize this technique at times of emergency.[3] Similarly the horsemen knew how to repair the saddles, etc.[4]

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1. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. III, p. 103.
2. _Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient_, Vol. IX., Part 1-11, Nov.1966, p. 84.
3. Adab ul Harb MS, p. 109a.
4. _Ibid._, p. 142a.

CHAPTER II

ARMY ORGANIZATION - OFFICERS, SALARIES POWER & POSITION

The army of the Turks was organized primarily on the decimal system. The officers designate were Khans, Maliks, Amirs, Sipah-Salars and Sarkhayls.[1] Bughra Khan's advice to Kaiqubad provides clue to undertaking the system of military gradation. A Sarkhayl had ten horsemen under him, a Sipah Salar commanded ten Sarkhayls, an Amir was in charge of ten Sipah Salar, a Malik had to command ten Amirs and a Khan had ten Maliks.[2] This was the requisite number, which each of these officers ought to have under him. But such a system was only adhered to when the ruler was strict enough and the Muster-Master did not allow any foul play. Strict watch was kept to see that

1. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 83.

2. Ibid., p. 145; Al-Qalqashandi, Subh ul Asha, English translation by Otto Spies, p. 67. It gives the military gradation during the reign of Muhammad Tughluq in which the Khan had ten thousand horsemen, the Malik one thousand, the Amir one hundred and the Sipah Salar less than hundred. The same gradation was also prevalent during the thirteenth century. Ahmed Aziz, Political History and Institutions of the Early Turkish Empire of Delhi (1206-1290 AD), Lahore, 1949, p. 355. Hereafter cited as Ahmed Aziz.

each officer had the requisite number of troops with him at the time of review. The gradation seems to have undergone some changes. Ibn Battuta's description of the army contingent of Malik Khattab, the officer incharge of the Rapri Unit shows that a Malik was required to maintain one thousand sawars.[1]

There was a central army stationed at Delhi called the Hashm-i Qalb and Hashm-i Atraf stationed at the provinces.[2]

The Hashm-i Atraf was under the command of the muqti and there was an ariz to assist him in matters of review, recruitment and payment etc. The thirteenth century sources, however, refer to the governors of the large territorial units as wali and not muqti. The Ariz was represented in the centre by his naib.[3] The provincial ariz had to submit his reports to the headquarter at Delhi.[4] The Muqti recruited the troops as

1. Ibn Battuta, Rehla, English translation by A. Mahdi Husain, Baroda 1976, p. 162.
2. Minhaj, p. 444.
3. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 116.
4. Ibid., p. 116; Qureishi, I.H., p. 199.

he "enjoyed considerable freedom of action in the matter of fighting against the Hindus and also against foreign invaders.[1] Balban had advised Bughra Khan who held the province of Samana and Sunam to increase the number of the provincial troops and raise their pay.[2] The provincial armies always combined together when ordered to help each other. Balban once sent Bughra Khan from Samana, martyr Prince from Multan and Malik Barbak Baktars from Delhi to check the Mongols.[3] Apart from these two main division of the army; troops were also garrisoned in forts and placed under the command of Kotwal. Balban had garrisoned on his own will important garrisons with Afghan soldiers in Gopalgir, Kampil, Patiali, Bhojpur and Jalali.[4] Their duty was to defend the adjoining areas and help the provincial governors at the time of need.

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1. Habibullah, A.B.M., The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India, Allahabad, second revised ed. 1961, p. 255. Hereafter cited as Habibullah, A.B.M.

   DAY, U.N., The Government of the Sultanate, New Delhi 1972, pp. 142-43.

2. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 80.

3. Ibid., pp. 57-58; Elliot & Dowson, Vol. III, p. 112; Day, U.N., p. 143.

4. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, pp. 57-58; Elliot & Dowson, Vol. III, p. 105.

We must now move into the study of the duties and functions of the Army Department in the centre, the duties and functions of the military officers and their mode of payment.

The Diwan-i Ariz or the Military Department was under the Ariz-i Mumalik. His duties were extensive, which ranged from recruitment of soldiers, review of troops, maintaining army discipline, hulia of the troops and payment, etc.[1] He held the review once a year[2] along with the King and the commander of the army. The candidates displayed their skill and prowess in his presence and were put on roll.[3] A review was also held on the eve of the battle.

For the cavalry, both the rider and his horse with arms and equipment, saddle, dress and weapons were checked.[4] The Ariz was very strict in his ins-

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1. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 61; Minhaj, p. 146.
2. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 326; Minhaj, p. 146.
3. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 102.
4. Adab ul Harb, p. 276.

pection. The soldiers came with mounts and weapons as recorded. Neither the recorded mount nor the weapons were allowed to be substituted by inferior ones.[1]

In the case of foot-soldier, his physical fitness, dress and weapons were checked. Each soldier's name and descriptive roll was properly recorded.

The duty of the Ariz was also to see that the army is contended, the commanders and soldiers were encouraged with promotions and rewards.[2] But it depended on the ruler whether he had bestowed these powers of promotion to him or not. Many a times the vizier had this privilege.[3]

At the times of war the Ariz accompanied the army or sent his naib to collect the spoils.[4] Amir Khusro's maternal grandfather was given the post of Ariz-i Mumalik under Sultan Balban and held the title

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1. Adab ul Harb, p. 276.

2. Ibid., p. 277; Qureishi, I.H., p. 137; Habibullah, A.B.M., p. 238.

3. Ahmed Aziz, p. 353.

4. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 326.

of Rawat-i Arz, as he descended from the Hindu caste Rawat.[1] Isami mentions that during the reign of Sultan Iltutmish, the fort of Gwalior was given in charge of a rawat-i arz, with a squadron of warriors.[2] Hence we may assume that it was not necessarily the rawat caste which initiated the name Rawat-i Arz, but it was a substitute title for a naib-i ariz.

In the Ministry of War, there were separate departments under different officers. The Amir-i Akhur was in charge of royal horse stable, the shahna-i Pil was in charge of elephants' stable, the Shahna-i nafar was the keeper of the camels' stable and Sar-i Silahdar was an officer in charge of armoury. Among the above mentioned officers, the Amir-i Akhur occupied the highest position. It was a very prestigious post and was "only conferred upon distinguished persons."[3] An Amir-i Akhur was an influential person and had few followings. Qutub-ud-Din Aibak held the post of Amir-i Akhur under Sultan Muhammad Ghuri.[4]

1. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, pp. 24, 153.
2. Futuh-us Salatin, English translation, Vol. I, p. 235.
3. Tabaqat-i Nasiri, **English Translation, p. 642.** ~~Vol. I, p. 235~~.
4. Ibid., p. 514.

When the Abyssanian slave Malik Jamal-ud-Din Yaqut was promoted to the post of Amir-i Akhur by Razia, it brought discontentment among the nobles.[1] The personal attendance of Yaqut upon Sultan Razia was not favoured.

The Amir-i Akhur was assisted by a naib called Naib Amir-i Akhur. We find in the Tabaqat-i Nasiri that Malik Badr-ud-Din Sunkar was first appointed Naib Amir-i Akhur and then promoted as Amir-i Akhur.[2]

The Amir-i Hajib or Lord Chamberlain, was one of the highest officer of the royal household and enjoyed great power and influence. The Amir-i Hajib was also known by the names of Malik-ul Hujjab and Sharif-ul Hujjab.[3] His military duties can be cited through few references given below.

(a) During the reign of Sultan Iltutmish Malik Izz-ud-Din Muhammad-i Salari was the Amir-i Hajib and while fighting against Nasir-ud-Din Qubacha, he was

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Eng.Tr.

1. Tabaqat-i Nasiri, p. 642.
2. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 752.
3. Minhaj, p. 294; Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, pp. 527-28.

the head of his troops.[1]

(b) Ghiyas-ud-Din Balban was the Amir-i Hajib under Sultan Mahmud and he was nominated to the head of the army to ravage the Jud hills and Jhilam, and the Khokhars.[2]

The Amir-i Hajib was assisted by a number of hajibs. His personal attache was called Khas Hajib.[3]

The Sar-i Jandar's[4] duties were exclusively military. He was the head of the King's bodyguards called jandars, who formed one integral part of his retinue.[5] This was a very prestigious post and those close to the Sultan were given the appointment as Sar-i Jandar. Fakhr-i Mudabbir says that Jandars were soldiers who gaurded the King's person.[6] Muhammad

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1. Tabaqat-i Nasiri, Eng.Tr. p. 613.

2. Ibid., p. 678.

3. Habibullah, A.B.M., p. 241.

4. Raverty, H.G. translates it as chief armour bearer.

5. Habibullah, A.B.M., p. 242.

6. Adab ul Harb, MS., p. 115a.

Ghuri was the Sar-i Jandar of his brother Sultan Ghiyas-ud-Din, and the territories of Istian and Kajuran were entrusted to his charge.[1]

Akram Makhdoome describes the Sar-i Jandar's military duty stating that he "was the commander of the body-guards, and the Sar-i Jandars of the right and left commanded the troops belonging to the royal body guards in their respective divisions in the camp".[2] S.A. Rahman similarly describes that "In the centre, the King had a special contingent of horsemen called Khasa-i Khail which was under Sar-i Jandar. The Khasa-i Khail was posted on the right and left wings of the centre, so the commanders of the wings were called Sar-i Jandar-i Maimna and Sar-i Jandar-i Maisra."[3]

A Sar-i Jandar also had administrative duties as well. Balban had appointed Malik Sunj Sarjandar

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1. Tabaqat-i Nasiri, Eng.Tr., p. 370.

2. Islamic Culture, Vol. XI, No. 4, Oct. 1937, p. 464.

3. Rahman, S.A., 'Conduct of Strategy and Tactics of war during the Muslim Rule in India', Islamic Culture, Vol. XX, No. 2, April 1946, p. 156.

as the Naib of Samana and the commander of its forces.[1] Similarly when Jalal-ud-Din was Sar-i Jandar under Balban he held the territory of Kaithal and the deputyship of Samana.[2]

The Amir-i Shikar or the Chief Huntsman. He too belonged to those categories of officials connected with the Royal Household. The position of the Amir-i Shikar is higher than that of the Sar-i Jandar. Iltutmish was promoted from Sar-i Jandar to few other posts and then made Amir-i Shikar.[3]

Organization:

The King was the commander-in-chief of the army, and led the army in the battle.[4] From the time of the Ghaznavids till the Timurids, there was no such ruler who did not take part in the battle. The King, however, had the right to appoint a commander called Sar-i Lashkar[5] to lead the army for any expedition.

1. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. III, p. 115.

2. Ibid., p. 143.

3. Tabaqat-i Nasiri, English translation, pp. 603-4.

4. Amir Khusrau, Khazain-ul Futuh, ed. S. Moinul Haq, Aligarh, 1927, p. 79. Hereafter cited as Khazain ul Futuh.

5. Ibid., p. 70.

The classification of the military officers underwent a change from the time of the Ghaznavids till the Delhi Sultans. The Ghurids adopted the title of Amir to denote the highest military name, e.g. Amir Faulad, Amir Suri, Amir Banji etc. but later on settled for the title of Malik.[1]

During the reign of Sultan Muhammad Ghuri, the Amirs and Maliks were the highest military officers, with the Amir being a bit inferior in the hierarchy.[2] The title of Malik remained the highest name till the days of Iltutmish. The title holders of Malik, like Malik Qutu-ud-Din Aibak, Malik Nasir-ud-Din Qubacha, Malik Taj-ud-Din Yalduz and even Iltutmish, later became independent Sultans. Sultan Razia had bestowed additional titles like Malik Kabir to Ikhtiyar-ud-Din Aitekin,[3] and Malik-ul Umara to Zia-ud-Din Junaid.[4] ~~This~~ This was to single out a favourite Malik or Amir.

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1. Rahman, S.A., Hindustan Ke Ahd-i Wasta Ka Fauji Nizam, Azamgarh 1960, p. 13. Hereafter cited as Rahman, S.A.
2. Ibid., p. 13.
3. Tabaqat-i Nasiri, English translation, p. 642.
4. Ibid., p. 644.

Later on the designation of Khan occupied the highest military rank and here too adjectives were added to the title of Khan like Ulugh, Kutlugh, etc. We thus had great military generals like Ulugh Khan (later Sultan Balban) and Kutlugh Khan (Malik Saif-ud-Din).[1]

The designation of Sipah Salar too underwent a change. During the Ghaznavids, after the Ariz, the next military commander was the Sipah Salar. He also held the administrative charge of a province. Under Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, the province of Khorasan was in command of his brother Nasir and afterwards Yusuf took charge. For the other provinces, there were Turk Sipah-Salars.[2] The Sipah Salar under the Ghorids occupied a high rank and was the leader of the vanguard. Qutub-ud-Din Aibak along with Sipah Salar Izz-ud-Din Husain, son of Kharmil, were the leaders of the van of the army that went against Rae of Benaras, Jai Chand.[3]

Civil duties were also given to the Sipah Salars. The Sipah Salar, Ali-i Kar-makh, was the wali (governor)

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1. Minhaj, p. 187.
2. Rahman, S.A., pp. 10-11.
3. Minhaj p. 140, English translation, p.516.

of Multan,[1] similarly Amir Ali-i Ismaili, the Sipah Salar was also Amir-i Dad of the capital city of Delhi.[2] Fakhr-i Mudabbir informs us of other military officers like Arif commanding 10, 30 or 40 soldiers, a khalifah or Amir-i Panjah commanding 50, a naqib having 100, a sarhang in charge of 500 and he stood at the centre with the King or the commander-in-chief.[3] A Qarabeg was also a high military officer who was in each main division of an army.[4] Barani mentions the name of Sahm al hashm and zahir al juyush as other military officers.[5] Under the Delhi Sultans we find the names of Talaya, Muqaddam Pesh,[6] Yazak[7] as scouts or advance guard who went ahead of the main army to spy on the enemy and bring informations. They even took part in skirmishes.

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1. Minhaj, p. 146.
2. Ibid., p. 170.
3. Adab ul Harb MS., pp. 144b, 194-96; Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 376.
4. Khazain-ul Futuh, p. 96.
5. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 62.
6. Minhaj, pp. 122, 228.
7. Ibid., pp. 122, 311; Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, pp. 90, 420; Isami, Futuh-us Salatin, ed. A.M. Husain, Agra 1938, pp. 422, 457. Hereafter cited as Isami.

When Balban entered Lakhnauti the scouts or tiliya were forty in number and sariyyah or advance guard were four hundred.[1]

A Kotwal was a very important official. He had the administrative responsibility of the fort and the area adjoining it. The keys of the fort was with the Kotwal. There was a separate Kotwal for the capital and at times acted as a Regent in the absence of the King. Malik Fakhr-ud-Din was the Kotwal of Delhi and acted as regent during Sultan Balban's absence from the capital.[2]

PAYMENT:

Sultan Mahmud paid the salary of his soldiers in cash as there no reference of land grant being given to any official or soldier. The Hindu soldiers must have joined his army because of cash payment.[3]

During the Turkish rule in India, we find different modes of payment. Land grants and cash pay-

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1. Islamic Culture, Vol. XI, No. 4, Oct. 1937, p. 465.
2. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. III, p. 115.
3. Rahman, S.A., p. 191.

payment, both were in vogue. Sultan Balban on enquiry found out that "two thousand horsemen of the army of Shams-ud-Din had received villages in the Doab by way of pay."[1] His steps to abolish these grants suggest that he paid the soldiers in cash. Land assignment were given to high military officers and those stationed at forts. The soldiers stationed at Gopalgir, Kampil, Patiali, Bhojpur and Jalali[2] drew "their sustenance from the lands which they were to cultivate.[3]

Those soldiers at the provinces were paid in cash as is evident from Balban's advice to Bughra Khan instructing him to raise the pay of the troops.[4] Apart from this fixed salary either cash or land grants, the soldiers also received their share of spoils after the battle.[5]

The Ariz-i Mumalik received his pay in assignments. Malik Tuzaki, the Diwan-i Arz had the fief of

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1. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. III, p. 107.
2. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, pp. 57-58.
3. Habibullah, A.B.M., p. 267.
4. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 80.
5. Ibid., p. 327.

Baran as his iqta.[1] Imad-ul-Mulk who too was a Ariz-i Mumalik is reported to have granted many villages for charity out of his own iqta.[2] Thus proving that the above officer was granted iqta as his salary. The pay of Sar-i Jandar were either in cash or land grant.(a)Iltutmish appointed Malik Saif-ud-Din Ibak-i Uchchah as Sar-i Jandar and granted the sum of three lacs jitals for his maintenance.[3] (b) Malik Bak Bak was the Sar-i Jandar during the reign of Sultan Balban and he held a jagir of 4000 horse and the fief of Badaun.[4] The jandars were paid in cash. Balban had employed Sistani soldiers and paid them 60,000-70,000 jitals per year.[5] The Amir-i Hajib was another paid officer who got land grant. Ulugh Khan as Amir-i Hajib got the province of Hansi in fief. After him the next Amir-i Hajib, Prince Ruknuddin got the same province.[6]

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1. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. III, p. 128.
2. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 117.
3. Minhaj, p. 237.
4. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. III, p. 101.
5. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 30.
6. Tabaqat-i Nasiri, Eng. Tr., pp. 694-95.

Raverty says that "Hansi appears to have been the peculiar appanage of the Amir-i Hajib.[1]

The officers like Khans, Maliks, Amirs and Sipah Salars got their pay in cash and when entrusted with administrative duties in provinces they got land grants.

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1. Tabaqat-i Nasiri, Eng. Tr. p. 693, fn. 3; also see Banerjee, A.C., 'Some Important Officers of the Sultanate of Delhi', Indian Culture, 1938(1), p. 77.

CHAPTER III

STRATEGY AND TACTICS -- WEAPONS AND METHOD OF WARFARE

The early Turkish Sultans employed basically those strategies of war which were prevalent in Central Asia. An account of their mobility, archery and formation of troops in battle array has been given in the 'Introduction' of this dissertation, I will, however, go in depth with regard to their characteristic method of warfare as depicted in Adab-ul Harb-wa Shujaat, Taj ul Maasir and Futuh us Salatin, etc.

Fakhr-i Mudabbir states that careful planning was necessary before going out for a campaign.[1] The Sultan always consulted the army chieftains in these matters. When Iltutmish felt the threat of Taj-ud-Din Yalduz, he summoned the army chieftains.[2] Likewise, Sultan Nasir-ud-Din called upon his army chiefs Qutub-ud-Din Hasan, Ulugh Khan, Sher Khan, Zahirul Mumalik and Balban-i Zar for consultation when the Mongols attacked the Sultanate's frontier. Sultan Nasir-ud-Din is said to have asked "What do you suggest in regard to repulsing the Mongols? Your intellect is the ultimate repository of wisdom. What method

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1. Adab ul Harb MS., pp. 205b, 206a.
2. Isami, verse 2079.

must we pursue in this matter? What strategy must we adopt against the Mongols."?[1]

The strategy to repulse the Mongol invasion was discussed and they resolved that "we should march the troops from here and check the advance of the Mongol army. We should lie in ambush for the enemies and by means of ambush let us repulse the demons."[2]

The War Council takes all the responsibility of forming the strategy of battle. All leading military officers attended this Council and a general outline of attack or defence was discussed. Final review was held on the eve of the battle and it was necessary to check the weapons, horses, the fitness of the warriors etc. Each soldier's name and description was properly recorded. The cavalrymen were first examined, followed by the foot-soldiers and auxiliary troops respectively.[3] The numerical strength of the army was exaggerated to dishearten any enemy's spy if present. When a contingent was reviewed and marched off, some of its cavalry returned to join a fresh con-

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1. Futuh-us Salatin, English translation, p.270.

2. Ibid., p. 271.

3. Adab-ul Harb, pp. 276-77.

tingent. This procedure was repeated, which showed an apparent increase in the force.[1] Rewards and promotions were promised so as to encourage the soldiers.[2] The review allotted the position of each division. First to pass the review was the Maysarah, then the Qalb and Maimnah. The duty of the Naqib-i Lashkar was to see that the troops presented themselves in the same order on the day of battle.

The battle-ground was chosen to suit the Turkish warriors, so that they may adapt to their traditional mode of warfare. A spacious battle-field was chosen for the army to move about in ease during the fight.[3] It helped them in manoeuvring effectively and they kept enough distance from the enemy, so that during retreat it would be difficult for the enemy to catch them.

Next the condition of the ground was also taken into account. Stony ground was avoided as it

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1. Adab ul Harb, p. 278; Islamic Culture, Vol. XI, No. 4, Oct. 1937, p. 468.

2. Adab ul Harb, p. 277.

3. Ibid., p. 317; Islamic Culture, Vol. XI, No. 4, Oct. 1937, p. 481.

injured the foot of the horse. It should not be swampy which will hinder the movement of the horse and tire it quickly. It was not to be dusty, because with the start of the battle, the dust raised prevented clear visibility. The ideal battle-ground was those covered with small pebbles mixed with mud which did not allow dust to be raised.[1]

The camp was safeguarded by digging trenches all around it and precautions were taken against night attack. The troops were divided into four sections: one section of foot archers and swordsmen and lancers, was appointed to guard the troops on the side from which the enemy's attack is feared. The right-wing and centre remained in their positions with no lights so that the enemy is unable to see them. Fire was lighted at a place where there was no one, so that when the enemies entered the camp from that side, they were sighted easily and killed.[2] The left-wing remained in its place, fully prepared to meet any eventuality. The fourth section of the soldiers had the duty to disperse the attack.[3]

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1. Adab ul Harb, p. 314.
2. Ibid., p. 299.
3. Ibid., p. 300.

Talaya or Muqaddama Paish were sent to bring information about the enemy. They also were trained soldiers and sometime took part in skirmishes while on their mission. Not only muqaddams but barids were employed to enter the enemy camp in disguise and gather necessary information about the strength and conditions of the enemy camp.

The army was divided thus - The Muqaddamah or vanguard, Maimna or the Right-Wing;Maisra i.e. the Left-Wing; Qalb; the Centre and Khalf, the Rear. Each of these division was placed under different commanders. The commander of the vanguard was called Sar-i Lashkar-i Muqaddamah,[1] of the Right-Wing was called Sar-i Fauj-i Maimna and that of the Left-Wing was known as Sar-i Fauj-i Maisra.[2] The Centre or the Qalb was usually commanded by the King, who had the best contingents of jandars and expert archers.[3] The jandars were known as Khas-i Khail and they were positioned at the right and left of the centre, under the commanders called Sar-i

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1. Minhaj, p. 120.

2. Isami, p. 250; Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 89.

3. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 26.

Jandar-i Maimna and Sar-i Jandar-i Maisra.[1] Similarly boy slaves were under the supervision of Amir-i Ghilman-i Maimna and Amir-i Ghilman-i Maisra.[2]

When the troops were arranged in the battle order, commands were communicated to the subordinates with the help of flag signals, drum beating, etc.[3]

Fakhr-i Mudabbir states that a battle should commence in the afternoon, because, if the enemy proves stronger, escape might be possible during the night.[4]

The Delhi Sultans rarely followed this advice. Sultan Muhammad Ghuri's battle against Rae Pithora started right in the morning and it caught the enemy unaware,[5] by this regained the initiative required to win the battle.

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1. Islamic Culture, Vol. XX, No. 2, April 1946, p. 156.
2. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 30.
3. Adab ul Harb MS., p. 159.
4. Adab ul Harb, p. 315.
5. Comprehensive History of India, Vol. V, p. 164; Sarkar, J.N., p. 35; Tabaqat-i Nasiri, English translation, p. 468.

A battle commenced with the vanguard making the first move,[1] then the Right-Wing came into the attack, the Centre then followed and the Left-Wing moved on its own course.[2] If the army was large a reserve contingent of few thousand was spared. They occupied an elevated place, and if they saw the enemy coming from outside to make a sudden attack on a particular wing of their own army; they prevented it by facing and attacking them.[3]

In the second battle of Tarain, Muhammad Ghuri adopted the tactics of harassing the enemy from all sides with their arrows so as to disorganize the enemy and with his reserve force of 12,000,[4] mounted archers the final blow was given which decided the fate of the battle.

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1. Islamic Culture, Vol. XXI, No. I, Jan. 1947, p. 8.

2. Adab ul Harb, p. 334; Islamic Culture, Vol.XI, No. 4, Oct. 1937, p. 483.

3. Adab ul Harb, p. 334.

4. Sarkar, J.N., p. 36.

In case of defeat the fleeing army adopted many strategies. They threw at the pursuers caltrops to wound the horses and delay their approach, if necessity arose even gold, clothes, vessels, saddles, etc. were thrown away. The enemy kept busy in gathering these spoils and allowed the army to escape.[1] If the fleeing army suddenly turned back and attacked the victorious army, the latter was often defeated. This was one of the common Turkish way of war.Muhammad Ghuri had gained victory over Rae Pithora by adopting this very tactics.[2]

The fleeing army in course of their retreat was dangerous as they turned in their saddle and shot accurately at the enemy.

Another method adopted by the Delhi Sultans was the surprise attack. If the enemy was large in number, it was simultaneously attacked from two or three sides to unnerve them. The best time to attack in summer was the afternoon and during winter, early in the morning, when the enemy's troop was asleep and

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1. Adab-ul Harb, MS., pp. 154b, 155.
2. Minhaj, p. 120; English translation, pp. 466-68. Islamic Culture, Vol. XX, No. 2, April 1946, p. 155.

the patrolling neglected.[1]

Tughril Beg was a prey to such a tactics. During the course of his rebellion against Sultan Balban, he had camped his troops near Jajnagar. A reconnoitering party of Sultan Balban under able warriors like Muhammad Sher-Andaz, Malik Mukadir and Ali (later Tughril-Kush) sighted his camp. They rushed at his camp and created chaos all over. Tughril was caught unaware and was killed. Thus one of the serious rebellion during Sultan Balban ended not by a decisive battle but by an ambush attack.[2]

Kamin or ambuscade attack was very cleverly used by Ulugh Khan against the Mongols. Isami mentions that in the year 656H. i.e. 1258 A.D. the Mongols were defeated by the troops of Ulugh Khan by an ambush attack.

"When the chieftains led troops according to the King's order against the infidels, they marched

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1. Adab-ul Harb, pp. 304-5.

2. Futuh-us Salatin English translation, Vol.II, p. 297; Elliot & Dowson, Vol. III, pp. 117-118.

straight beyond the confines of Hindustan, and lay in ambush in the Indus Valley ....". Having raided the territories of Hindustan all of them soon arrived in Indus Valley with their horses laden with heavy booty. Someone had placed his captives on his horse and carelessly thrown the war equipments on the saddle. Another having freed himself from the worries of war had loaded his horse with heavy booty to such an extent that his horse could hardly move freely and stumbled ten times in the way. In this manner, when the accursed herds arrived suddenly in the danger zone, the royal army sprang from the ambush from every side. They fell upon them swiftly and speared their bodies."[1]

WEAPONS USED:

Hasan Nizami and Fakhr-i Mudabbir have given explicit accounts on weapons. Each weapon had a diferent role to play, but the resultant being the death of the enemy. There were weapons, which were used from a distance, like bow and arrows; when the soldiers closed in but were few yards away Khist (javelin or dart) niza (short spear) and Shira etc were used. When they came face to face, battle-axe, mace, sword, lance, dagger,

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1. Futuh-us Salatin, Eng.tr., p. 272.

etc were employed. We must therefore go in details to see the use of the weapons and the technique involved that gave the warrior his prey.

The chief weapons of the horsemen were Khadang (bow and arrows) sword, mace, spear and nachakh.

The bow and arrow was the main offensive weapon[1] and the Turks were very accurate shooters. There were various kinds of arrows and each was prescribed for effective use on different occasions. Fished-backed or round arrows could easily pass through a coat of mail or a breast plate. Some were many headed and poisoned and was difficult to extricate its point from the body.[2] Arrows made from seasoned reed travels fast, straight and inflicts a fatal wound, if its point is sharp and of steel.[3] The names of arrows as found in Taj-ul Maasir are nawak and partab.[4]

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1. ~~Futuh-us Salatin Eng.Tr., p. 272.~~
1. Adab-ul Harb, p. 241.
2. Ibid., pp. 242-43.
3. Ibid., p. 244.
4. Nizami, K.A., On History and Historians of Medieval India, New Delhi 1983, p. 66. List of weapons are given on the basis of Taj-ul Maathir, hereafter cited as On History and Historians.

There were various types of bow, for example Chachi, Khwarizmi, Parwanchi, Ghaznichi, Lahori, Karori and Indian etc. The Chachi bow was very commonly used by the Central Asian arcners.[1]

Paterson describes a bow as "a simple machine for storing energy by the action of the archer in drawing the string. When he looses the string it is transferred in the form of kinetic energy to the arrow."[2]

The sword was one of the most important weapons for hand to hand fight. They are also of different varieties, depending on the place of its origin like Russian, Chinese, Khizri, Roman, Firangi, Yamini, Sulaimani, Shahi, Alai Kashmiri and Indian. The best among them being the Indian sword called Mauj-i Darya.[3] It was sharp, strong and shiny. The Khurasani and Iraqi swords were not sharp but they did not break easily.[4]

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1. Adab-ul Harb, p. 243.

2. W.F. Paterson, Archers of Islam, Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. IX, Part i-ii, Nov. 1966, Leiden, pp. 77-78.

3. Adab-ul Harb, p. 258.

4. Ibid., p. 259.

A <u>Dashnah</u> or scimitar was a short and curve sword, broadest at the point end,[1] <u>Qalachuri</u> was a long and curved sword, and was a favourite with the Turks. Its curve caused a very deep wound. It was also substituted for a lance, if the latter broke.

<u>Mace</u> was another offensive weapon which had names like <u>Gurz</u>, <u>Kopal</u>, <u>Dabus</u> or <u>Amud</u> and <u>Tabar</u>. It was a heavy weapon and the different names given to it was due to slight difference at their structure. The <u>Gurz</u> was a battle axe, <u>Kopal</u> was a ponderous club, <u>Dabus</u> was an iron-headed mace and <u>Tabar</u> a battle axe fixed to the saddle.[2]

A <u>Lance</u> was a long but light weapon. It was also known as <u>nizah</u>, Shira and Sinan.[3] In the first battle of Tarain Muhammad Ghori had knocked of few of Gobind Rai's teeth by hitting with his lance.[4]

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1. <u>Adab-ul Harb</u> MS., pp. 115-16.

2. <u>Adab-ul Harb</u>, pp. 260-62; <u>On History and Historians</u>, p. 66.

3. <u>Adab-ul Harb</u>, pp. 260-61. It is mentioned as Shira and as Shira and Sinan in Nizami's <u>On History and Historians</u>.

4. <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u> English translation, p. 460; <u>Futuh-us Salatin</u>, p. 143.

Nizah and Harbah[1] the other two varieties of lance are a bit shorter than Sinan and Shira. Zepin was also of the same type but more dangerous as it "could pin man and horse together if struck with force."[2] A bhalla was a heavier javelin.[3] Nizah-i mardgir was a long weapon with the blade being curved at the point.[4] A Khist was long and a heavy weapon. Its blow was very dangerous as it had a combined structure of a lance and battle-axe.[5]

The Nachakh formed one of the offensive weapon of the horseman. "It was a combination of mace and sword and had the shape of a new moon."[6]

There was also a weapon called Jak. It was a disc of iron with sharp edges. It was light and had a big hole in the centre. It could travel far (depend-

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1. Adab-ul Harb, p. 260.
2. Ibid., p. 260; Hasan Nizami, Taj-ul Maathir, Hyderabad MS, p. 420. Hereafter cited as Taj-ul Maathir.
3. Adab-ul Harb, MS., p. 204.
4. Ibid., p. 178b.
5. Ibid., p. 115.
6. Adab-ul Harb, p. 260; Taj-ul Maathir, p. 282.

ing on the ability and skill of the warrior) and was capable of cutting off the enemy's head. There was a heavier jak which was thrown vertically in the air and the force generated by its fall could cut a man in two.[1] A Kamand (lasso) was always carried by the warriors and it was thrown to entangle the enemy.[2] The Khanjar (dagger) was a weapon very common and it was carried by all the warriors. This was used when the warriors were on the ground and no other offensive weapon could be utilized.

The weapons of the footsoldiers differed according to their rank in the arrayed battle-field. The first rank of foot-soldiers were armed with bow and arrows, lance and shield. The next rank of foot-soldiers wore coats of mail and armed with spear and sword. The third line had lance, bow and arrows and long swords, and finally the fourth set of foot-soldiers had spear, shield and sword.[3]

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1. Adab-ul Harb MS., pp. 199b, 200.
2. Adab-ul Harb, p. 540.
3. Ibid., p. 330.

Their defensive armour were broad shield[1] and a coat of mail which "had a number of pieces so fastened as to facilitate the movements of limbs."[2] This coat of mail was called char ayina.[3]

A horseman's defensive armour was a zirah and under it was a vest of leather called Khaftan.[4] He was also protected by a helmet called Tark[5] and mighfar[6] (a net work of steel worn under the cap to protect the face).

There were separate guards for the thighs, shanks and forearm.[7] Hasan Nizami mentions that Muhammad Ghori's force mustered for the battle before Benaras had fifty thousand mounted men clad in iron.[8] The iron signifies the defensive armour worn by the warriors.

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1. Ibid., p. 330.
2. Islamic Culture, Vol. XI, No.4, Oct. 1937, p. 478.
3. On History and Historians, p. 66.
4. Adab-ul Harb MS., p. 156; Taj-ul Maathir, p. 47.
5. On History and Historians, p. 66.
6. Ibid., p. 66.
7. Adab-ul Harb MS., p. 156; Taj-ul Maathir, p. 47.
8. Taj-ul Maathir, p. 277; Elliot & Dowson, Vol. III, p. 220.

The fort capturing forces had Charkh to discharge heavy arrows and short spears named Baylak and Nim Nizah.[1] The Charkh was a "magnified crossbow.[2] The Kharak (drill)[3] was another weapon used for the siege of forts. It was a big beam with sharp point which was used with a technique for making holes in the wall. Sometimes it was adjusted with another horizontal beam having the head of an iron which dashed against the wall with a great force. "While the bore packed it, the ram battered it."[4]

Thus we see that the strategies of war adopted by the Turks were far superior to those of the Rajputs and they employed it effectively whenever the need arose. Weapons too were of high quality and the technique with which they used were with great precision. It fully served the purpose whether it was an open battle-field or fort capturing.

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1. Adab-ul Harb, pp. 242, 244, 260; Taj-ul Maathir, p. 113.
2. Islamic Culture, Vol. XI, No. 4, Oct.1937, p. 476.
3. Adab-ul Harb MS., p. 178.
4. Islamic Culture, Vol. XI, No. 4, Oct. 1937, p. 475.

CHAPTER - IV

POSITION OF FORTS

To have a strong foothold in India, Muhammad Ghuri knew he first had to consolidate his position at strategic points. He was desperately in need of military base in India and to achieve this he had to face stiff resistance offered by the Rajputs. His route to India lay through the Gomal Pass,[1] and the very first military outpost which lay in his way was Multan. This fort was taken by Muhammad bin Qasim and after him, it was time to time occupied by different powers. At the time of Muhammad Ghuri's invasion Multan was in the hands of the Qaramitahs. Muhammad Ghuri took it after a long siege. The fort was situated on the banks of Ravi and had natural protection.[2] If fully supplied with food and heavily garrisoned it could check any threat coming from the north-west. Muhammad Ghuri needed it for extending his power in India.` During the Sultanate period it was a very important outpost and was fully garrisoned to check

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1. Rahman, S.A., 'Military Stations during the early period of Muslim rule in Hind-Pakistan', Journal of Pakistan Historical Society, Vol.I, Part 4, Jan. 1953, p. 318. Hereafter cited as JPHS.

2. Ibid., Vol. I, Part 4, Jan. 1953, p. 319.

the Mongols. Only important officers or relatives of the Sultan were given the charge of this fort. During Sultan Nasir-ud-Din Mahmud's reign Balban-i-Zar was made the governor of Multan, whose loyalty was never doubted, but later on he revolted which caused great concern to the Sultan.[1]

Balban had placed his nephew Sher Khan in charge of Lahore, Multan, Bhukkar, Surhind, Depalpore and Bituhnda and after him, Prince Mahomed was given the charge.[2]

In roads could be better checked and the frontier well defended with Multan and Uchh both being simultaneously under control. Way to India lay through these places and Muhammad Ghuri, took it to consolidate his position in Sind. Further more they lay on route to Nahrwala and its capture made Muhammad Ghuri's in-roads to Gujarat easier. Uchh was situated 70 miles to the south-west of Multan at the then confluence of the five rivers of the Punjab.[3] Uchh's importance could further be sensed at it was the capital of Nasir-ud-Din Qabajah.

1. Futuh-us Salatin Eng.tr., p. 276.
2. Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi, p. 81.
3. J.P.H.S., Vol. I, Part 4, Jan. 1953, p.319.

Peshawar served as a military base to check the dependencies. The capture of Peshawar helped in having complete sway over Panjab. Qutub-ud-Din Aibak moved as far as Peshawar to meet Muhammad Ghuri during his campaign of Kanauj. We can judge that it was a safe place for both the armies of Qutub-ud Din Aibak and Muhammad Ghuri to meet.

Lahore, however, was given more preference as a military station than the above two mentioned forts due to its strategic location. River Beas formed one of the natural line of defence for the fort. Muhammad Ghuri ousted Khusraw Malik to gain the possession of the fort. With the capture of Lahore "the kingdom of Hindustan came under his sway."[1] It had to be effectively garrisoned to check the Khokhars and other rebels who resided in the hills of Lahore. With the establishment of the Turkish rule in India, it became the victim of many Mongol invasions,[2] as it was the western frontier province. It had also been a bone of contention between Yalduz, Kabajah and Iltutmish,[3] because

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1. Tabagat-i Nasiri, Eng. tr., p. 455.

2. Day, U.N., 'The North-West Frontier of the Sultanate during the 13th Century', I.H.Q., Vol. 17, Part I, March 1941, p. 60. Hereafter cited as I.H.Q.

3. Tabagat-i Nasiri Eng.tr., pp. 526-30.

it "occupied the strategic position and could easily destroy the flanks of any army marching towards Multan and at the same time, it formed a suitable base for any expedition in the unregulated tract of the Salt Range."[1]

Sultan Balban appointed a place of rendezvous near Lahore in case of invasion from the north-west. Prince Muhammad was to move from his position in the frontier province and Kurra Khan from his estate of Sumana and Sunam to meet the Imperial army from Delhi, at Lahore.[2]

Dewal, Daybalor Debal:

Its exact position is controversial, but one must agree that it lay on the sea-coast.[3] The fort was given importance due to the fact that the territories adjoining it were commercially important, though its military utility was of little value as sea warfare was not yet so prominent among the rulers of India.

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1. I.H.C., Vol. 17, Part I, March 1941, p. 60.
2. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. III, p. 112.
3. Tabaqat-i Nasiri Eng. tr., p. 453; Elliot & Dowson, Vol. I, Appendix, pp. 374-78; JPHS, Vol. I, Part 4, Jan. 1953, p. 321.

Bhakkar:

It was one of the strongest fort during this period to which Hasan Nizami says that it "had not been taken by any Khusru" ..... and it "was the eye of the fort and the face of the Kingdom of Hind."[1]

It was a fortified island in the river Indus,[2] and it was strategically important for those rulers who had fleets. Kabajah had escaped from Uchh to Bhakkar on a boat, (as both these places are connected by R. Sindhu), thus giving a tough time to Iltutmish who was without fleets. The fort capitulated after Kabajah committed suicide.

Sialkot:

It is situated at the foot of the north-western regions of the Himalayas. It is close to Lahore and it was captured by Muhammad Ghuri to have a base closer to Lahore. Khusrau Malik at that time was the master of Lahore[3] and to check him Muhammad

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1. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. II, p. 239.

2. Imperial Gazetteer of India, New ed., New Delhi, Vol. IX, pp. 46-47. Hereafter cited as Imperial Gazetteer.

3. Minhaj, p. 117; Abul Qasim Hindu Shah Ferishta, Tarikh-i Ferishta, New Kishore Press, 1865, pp. 56-57. Hereafter cited as Ferishta.

Ghuri stationed his troops at Sialkot. When Lahore fell Muhammad Ghuri's interest in Sialkot was now only to keep watch over the areas lying between rivers Chenab and Ravi.

Bhatindah or Tabarhinda:

It is situated at 100 miles north of Hansi, and was a very important fort which gave Muhammad Ghuri a military position of vantage in the Chauhan territory to penetrate its capital.[1] It was garrisoned under Qazi Zia-ud-Din Tulak with 12000 soldiers,[2] with provision for eight months, but being such a strong fort, it resisted the Rajput onslaught for thirteen months.[3] Under Iltutmish it was a crown province. "The great fort, about 118 ft. high is conspicuous for many miles around and has 36 bastions.[4] Its capitulation led to the submission of the adjoining forts of Kuhram, Hansi, Samana and Sunam,[5] which were garri-

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1. J.P.H.S., Vol. I, Part 4, Jan. 1953, pp. 323-25.
2. Minhaj, p. 118; Ferishta, Vol.I, p. 57.
3. Tabaqat-i Nasiri Eng tr., p. 464.
4. Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. VIII, p. 89.
5. Minhaj, p. 120; Ferishta, Vol. I, p. 56.

soned, with this the conquered territories were easy to govern.

Kuhram & Samana:

Both were close by and they were the military bases from where the immediate eastern territories could be subjugated and the adjoining forts defended. When Hansi was attacked by Jitwan, Qutub-ud-Din Aibak moved from Kuhram to relieve the fort of Hansi.[1] Other forts like Hansi, Sirsuti and Sunam were garrisoned for the consolidation of the occupied territories.[2]

Ranthambhor:

Its importance lay in having a strong foothold in the hostile territory of Rajputana. This fort was defended by natural barriers. It is situated on a rock 1578 ft above sea level, surrounded by a massive **wall** strengthened by towers and bastions.[3] It is isolated by deep and inpassable ravines,[4] with river Chambal defending it from one side. Minhaj praises

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1. J.P.H.S., Vol. I, Part 4, Jan. 1953, p.327.
2. Minhaj, p. 120; Ferishta, Vol. I, p. 56.
3. Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. XXI, pp. 235-36.
4. J.P.H.S., Vol. I, Part 4, Jan. 1953, p. 326.

the fort "for its exceeding strength, solidity, and impregnability, is famous and notorious throughout all Hindustan."[1] Isami's Ranthambhore "possessed a fortress unlike that of any other period."[2] This fort was always problematic for the Sultans, as it was surrounded by hostile Hindu inhabitants. Iltutmish had to relieve it after the death of Qutub-ud-Din Aibak.[3] Sultan Razia too had to issue orders to Malik Qutub-ud-Din Husain to capture it from the Hindus;[4] similarly Sultan Nasir-ud-Din Mahmud too was not in possession of this fort and had to send expeditions against it.

<u>Meerut</u>:

Qutub-ud-Din Aibak's main aim for capturing Meerut was because of its strategic location in the upper Doab.[5] It enabled him to check the Gahadawala Rajputs. Meerut and Koil both formed one of the

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1. <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u> Eng. tr., pp. 610-11.
2. <u>Futuh-us Salatin</u> Eng. tr., Vol. II, p.235.
3. <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u> Eng. tr., Vol. I, p. 617.
4. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 642.
5. <u>J.P.H.S.</u>, Vol. I, Part 4, Jan. 1953, p. 327.

strongest garrisons of the early Turkish Sultans. The fort of Meerut, in the words of Hasan Nizami was "one of the celebrated forts of the country of Hind, for the strength of its foundations and superstructure, and its ditch, which was as broad as the ocean and fathomless.[1] It was surrounded by a citadel pierced with nine gates.[2]

Delhi:

Its conquest was necessitated for occupying the territories of the Chauhan rulers who had Ajmere as his capital and Delhi as a second headquarter. The Turks, however, gave Delhi more importance because of its location in the centre of the then occupied territories. It is situated on the western bank of river Jumna and the fortress described in the Taj-ul Maathir as being one "which in height and strength had not its equal nor second throughout the length and breadth of the seven climes."[3] This was the best place for becoming the capital of the new state.[4]

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1. Elliot and Dowson, Vol. 2, p. 217.
2. J.P.H.S., Vol. I, Part 4, Jan. 1953, p. 327.
3. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. II, p. 214.
4. J.P.H.S., Vol. I, Part 4, Jan. 1953, p. 328.

Koil:

It was one of the most celebrated fortress of Hind.[1] It was important to possess this fort due to its proximity to Delhi, Meerut, Badayun, etc. It was a very important military base which facilitated incursions to the east. Muhammad Ghuri campaign of Qannauj succeeded due to the military base at Koil.[2]

Qannauj:

The territory of Qannauj had seven forts washed by the Ganges and providing a natural line of defence.[3] It was the capital of the Rathor Rajputs and was situated in the heart of Doab.[4] With its conquest the Turks became the master of the Doab, Benares[5] along with Ansi and Asni[6] succumbed to the Turkish onslaught.

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1. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. II, p. 220.
2. J.P.H.S., Vol. I, Part 4, Jan. 1953, p.328.
3. Ibid., p. 329.
4. Ibid., p. 328.
5. Tabaqat-i Nasiri Eng. tr., Vol. I, p. 470.
6. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. II, p. 463.

Thankir:

It was the stronghold of the Jadon Bhatti Rajputs, who held sway over Bayana.[1] The castle "which had hitherto remained closed to all the sovereigns and princes of the world."[2] Strategically it was necessary to have a military base at Thankir to harass the fort of Gwalior.[3] Baha-ud-Din Tughril who was made in-charge of the fort "constructed a military station at Sultankot which was meant to serve as base of operations in the plains.[4]

Gwalior:

The Parihara Rajputs ruled over this territory. The fort in the words of Hasan Nizami was "the pearl of the recklace of the castles of Hind, the summit of which the nimble footed wind from below cannot reach, and on the bastion of which the rapid clouds have never cast their shade, and which the swift imagination has never surmounted, and at the height of which

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1. J.P.H.S., Vol. I, Part 4, Jan. 1953, p. 330.
2. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. II, p. 224.
3. J.P.H.S., Vol. I, Part 4, Jan. 1953, p. 330; Tabaqat-i Nasiri Eng. tr., p. 545.
4. Habibullah, A.B.M., p. 66.

the celestial sphere is dazzled."[1] The fort stands on an isolated sandstone hill, which towers 300 ft. above the old town, measuring 1¾ miles long and 2,800 ft. across at its widest part. The walls above the scrap are about 30 ft. high.[2] Baha-ud-Din Tughril was the commander of the forces which captured it in 1196 A.D.[3] The neighbouring Rajputs were so hostile that it passed into the hands of Mangal Diw.[4] Sultan Iltutmish had to proceed towards it in 1231 A.D. and it fell into his hands in 1232 A.D.[5] Here again it did not remain with the Delhi Sultan for long. Razia had to "withdraw the military and civil personnel and excort back to Delhi"[6] because Chahardevā the ruler of that area commenced hostilities. Balban in the year 1251 A.D. moved against Gwalior and captured it.[7] Though again there are references that it passed over to the Rajputs.[8]

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1. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. II, p. 225.
2. Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. XII, p. 439.
3. Minhaj, p. 145.
4. Tabaqat-i Nasiri Eng. tr., p. 619.
5. Minhaj, p. 175; Habibullah, ABM., p. 102.
6. Habibullah, ABM, p. 151.
7. Minhaj, pp. 215-16.
8. Habibullah, ABM, p. 151.

Kalinjar:

It was the capital of the Chandella Rajputs. The fort was situated near the Bhander Plateau with one of the tributaries of river Ken passing across it.[1] This fort occupies a hill which rises abruptly, and is separated from the nearest eminence by a valley about 7 miles across. Elevation is 1,203 ft. above the sea. The crown of the hill is a plateau. Vast polyhedral masses of Syenite form the base and afford a comparatively accessible slope, but the horizontal strata of sandstone makes it impossible of ascent.[2] No doubt, Hasan Nizami says that the fort of Kalinjar was as strong as the wall of Alexander.[3] This fort capitulated only when the hill-side spring which was the only supply, diverted to another course.[4] Adjoining forts of Mahoba and Khajuraho too were captured to check the hostile Chandellas.[5]

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1. Joseph E. Schwartzberg, A Historical Atlas of South Asia, Chicago 1978. See Physiography transparent plate.
2. Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. XIV, p. 310.
3. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. 2, p. 229.
4. Habibullah, ABM, p. 69; Raverty, H.G. says that the spring had dried up, p. 523 fn.
5. Adab-ul Harb MS, p. 25; Elliot & Dowson, Vol. 2, p. 229.

Anhilwarah or Nahrwalah:

The Chalukya state of Gujerat "held on effective paramountcy over the western Rajput states and thus was an obstacle to his plan of outflaming the Ghaznavids and opening up a route into Hindustan.[1] His plan was earlier frustrated, but later Qutub-ud-Din Aibak in 1197 marched with forces stationed at Ajmir and reached the forts of Pali and Nandul which he found abandoned.[2] He proceeded to Nahrwala and at the foot of Mount Abu he found the army of Rai Karan and Darabars[3] waiting to face the Turkish army. The Rajputs were routed and "the city of Nahrwala, which is the most celebrated in that country, full of rivers ... came under the dominion of the Musalmans,"[4] at which the world was amazed.[5]

Badayun:

It was captured in 594 H./1197-98 AD by Qutub-ud-Din Aibak.[6] It was a seat of Rashtrakuta

1. Habibullah, ABM, p. 56.
2. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. 2, p. 227.
3. Ibid., p. 227.
4. Ibid., p. 227.
5. Futuh-us Salatin Eng.tr., Vol. I, p. 163.
6. Adab-ul Harb MS, p. 24.

Dynasty, which whencaptured, enabled the Turks to form a series of stronghold with Mirath, Koil and Baran. This enabled the region of Katehar to be subdued too. The fief of Badayun later became an important iqta of the Delhi Sultanate. "It was here that Iltutmish mobilised a strong army to help his master in suppressing the rebellion of the Ghakkar tribes."[1]

The forts had defensive implements to protect itself from the attackers. To protect itself from the fiery javelins and other combustibles, the soldiers wore "leathern mantlets soaked in vineger"[2] as it was the best means of quenching fire.[3] The garrison also kept boiling oil to throw on the besiegers approaching the fort walls.[4] The besiegers applied Kharak to make holes in the wall[5] and to check thus the garrison adopted the use of "thick mattress like sheets of sacking filled with straw or board and thick beams which they hung from the wall over the point on which the machine played. They disabled the ram by letting fall

1. J.P.H.S., Vol. I, Part 4, Jan. 1953, p. 331.

2. Islamic Culture, Vol. XI, No. 4, Oct. 1937, p. 474.

3. Ibid., p. 474.

4. Ibid., p. 474.

5. Adab-ul Harb MS., p. 178.

on its head forked beams, which held it firm and prevented it from being drawn back."[1]

The Charkh was a magnified cross-bow used for discharging heavy bolt and javelins to a considerable long distance.[2] This was most probably used both by the defenders and the besiegers.

The simplest device which was used for scaling the walls of the fort was by scaling ladders or kamand (lasso).[3] Similarly the forts simplest defence system was by digging trenches all round the castle and filling it with moat or water.


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1. Makhdoome, M. Akram, 'Mechanical Artillery in Medieval India', Journal of Indian History, Vol. XV, Part 2, Aug. 1936, p. 190.

2. Islamic Culture, Vol. XI, No. 4, Oct. 1937, p. 476.

3. Adab-ul Harb, p. 540.

IMPORTANT FORTS DURING THE 13th CENTURY



CONCLUSION

The Ghaznavid campaigns in India showed the military weakness of the Indian Rajputs, who "were never took advantage of the immense natural advantageous of the vastness of the country or of its rivers, forests etc." The Rajputs were indifferent towards having a scientific frontier to defend themselves, and this attitude of the Rajputs proved advantageous to the north-west invaders.

At the time of the Ghurid conquest, India was divided into a number of independent and semi-independent kingdoms. The Chahamanas ruled in Sambhar and Ajmer, the Paramaras in Malwa, the Kalachuris in Chedi, the Chandellas in Bundelkhand, the Chalukyas in Gujarat, the Gahadavalas in Kannauj, the Palas in Magadh, the Suras and later the Senas,ruled in Western Bengal. Furthermore the Rajput government was feudal in character by which the kingdom came to be divided in fiefs. This system led to a complete disintegration of the country. The Rajputs united against the Turks during the first and the second Battle of Tarain, but after this they never formed a confederacy. One by one each of these kingdoms were conquered. Military stations were established at strategic points which were garrisoned with

well equipped soldiers. These military stations facilitated the expansionist policy of the Turks. The Central Asian traditions of warfare predominated over the Rajput traditions. The Rajputs' army consisted of elephantry, cavalry and infantry. "In the hands of expert generals, the elephants proved dreadful; but if badly handled their destructive force could recoil on their own army." As pointed out by P. Saran "their (Rajputs) cumbrous war-Machine with its elephants and horses, trained more for royal pageants than for serious warfare, was easily overtaken and outdistanced by the agile mounted archers of the Turkish armies who could cover long distances far more quickly than the easy-going, vain glorious Hindu chiefs." The swift moving mounted archers of the Turks outclassed as J.N. Sarkar says the "huge and unwieldy phalanx of (Indian) armies headed by elephants with gorgeous trappings." In the open battle-field the Rajputs were no match to the Turkish cavalry; the former thus took to defending their forts. In construction, the forts of the Rajputs were almost impregnable e.g. forts of Ranthambhor, Koil, Delhi, Kalinjar etc, but they never made their forts as a means to launch powerful offensive against the enemies. The Turks showed their prowess in capturing forts too. Forts which in the words of

Hasan Nizami "in height and strength had not its equal nor second throughout the length and breadth of seven climes" and those which "as strong as the wall of Alexander" were all taken. The Rajputs were too novice in the art of besieging forts. They did not employ any scientific skill to besiege a fort. The only method which they knew was to use their elephants to strike against the fort gates. This method proved ineffective when a fort was at a very high altitude or if surrounded by moat. The Turks employed charks to discharge heavy arrows and short spears named Baylak and Nim Nizah to capture a fort. They also had another war machine named Kharak which was used for making holes in the wall. Thus both on the battle-field and in forts besieging, the Turks were far more superior to the Rajputs. The neglect of this art of warfare by the Rajputs proved disastrous for which they paid dearly their life and liberty.

When Delhi was made the seat of government and hostile territories subdued, a change was brought in the composition of the army. "Fighting ceased to be the monopoly of one group. Anyone who had the strength to bear the strain of war, could join the army ----- recruitment was made from

all sections of the Indian population, irrespective of any consideration of caste, creed or colour." Many thakuras and Ranas too were taken into service. All were given the same training of warfare. Boxing, wrestling, fencing, archery etc were basic military sports in which every soldier participated to keep themselves fit. Hunting expeditions too were a part of military exercise.

The army was centrally recruited and paid directly by the state. Land grants and cash payment both were in practice, as payment of the soldiers. High officials were given bigger iqtas and bestowed with administrative power. The Ariz-i Mumalik was the muster master and his duties included recruitment of soldiers, review of troops, payment and participation in the war council. There were other officers like Amir-i Akhur (Master of the Royal Stable), Sar-i Jandar (Chief of Bodyguards), Amir-i Hajib (Lord Chamberlain) and Kotwal (Incharge of the fort). They were given administrative power of any province or a fort. The army was divided on the decimal system. A Sarkhayl commanded 10 horsemen, a Sipah-Salar commanded 10 Sarkhayls, an Amir had 10 Sipah-Salars, likewise a Malik had 10 Amirs and a Khan 10 Maliks. The King was the commander-in-chief

of the army, but also appointed a Sar-i-Lashkar to lead a campaign in his absence.

The Turks adopted different strategies of war on different occasions. Their army was composed of cavalry and infantry, with the cavalry being in the majority. At times the cavalry formed the first line and when the situation demanded the infantry formed the first line.

The Turks were great archers and good horsemen. They could shoot accurately from the horseback without halting or dismounting. They adopted different strategies of war like feigned retreat, ambushing, night attack etc. Their main offensive weapons were bow and arrows, lance, swords, daggers etc. These were the primary weapons which every horseman had; some were even armed with jak, Kamand, Khist Kachakh and Dabus.

With such weapons and their Central Asian strategies, the Turks were able to defeat the Rajputs and establish the Sultanate of Delhi.

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
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